En soutien du séminaire organisé par Hestia Expertise en 2016, « Maghreb 2020, Etat, nation et société », cette page propose une bibliographie en ligne. Elle ne retient que les dernières contributions, depuis mars 2015.

Elle sera régulièrement mise à jour en 2016 au fil des parutions. Pour toute suggestion, écrire à hestia@msh-paris.fr

Avril 2016

• Ferjani (Said), “The “End of Islamism” and the Future of Tunisia”, Hudson Institute, April 29th, 2016, Lire / Read.

In this interview, Ferjani, a prominent leader of Ennahdha, answers questions that delve into the movement’s past and look at its future.

• Ghanem-Yazbeck (Dalia), “Algeria on the Verge: What Seventeen Years of Bouteflika Have Achieved”, The Carnegie Middle East Program, April 28, 2016, Lire / Read.

Abstract : As Algeria begins preparing for the post-Bouteflika era, the president’s political legacy will have a major impact on shaping what lies ahead for the country. Despite the return to stability, the national reconciliation policy appears fragile as it failed to address the roots of the country’s violence. Yet doing so may become unavoidable to better deal with a host of challenges, including unemployment, poverty, housing shortages, corruption, a lack of governance, and the threat of jihadism. In addition, Algeria operates in a highly unstable region, which makes its traditional policy of nonintervention no longer viable.

• Boukhars (Anouar), “In the Eye of the Storm: Algeria’s South and its Sahelian Borders”, The Carnegie Middle East Program, April 26, 2016, Lire / Read.

Abstract : After decades of struggling with political dissent and claims for increased regional autonomy in the northern region of Kabyle north, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s regime has since 2013 been confronted with a comparable challenge in its Saharan South. This has pushed the regime to reconfigure the country’s internal geopolitics and the perception of its vast Saharan spaces, as well as the turbulent areas in the neighboring Sahel countries. The dramatic deterioration of order on the periphery of its borders has raised the potential risk of spillovers into Algeria’s treasure-chest southern territory. Taming regional disorder has acquired special urgency as the precariousness of the southern frontiers has been catapulted into a situation of acute social crisis and ethnic tensions. This prospect of destabilization of Algeria’s economic heartland is shaking up the internal geopolitical order, leading to a probable reorientation from the traditional east-west axis to a north–south axis.

• Brahimi (Abdallah), “Algeria’s Military Makeover”, Sada, April 19, 2016, Lire / Read.

Abstract : Following the dismantling of the once-powerful Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS), Algeria’s government is making efforts to demonstrate its control of the military, as was on display as the military ramped up its counterterrorism operations in March. With these operations, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and his allies are not only trying to demonstrate to elites linked to the former DRS that they do indeed have full control over the security forces, but also to rebuild popular confidence in the Algerian military’s ability to maintain public security. Furthermore, the Algerian government is sending a message to France, its neighbors in the Sahel, and other countries interested in regional security that Algeria is still the dominant player. However, reasonable doubts remain over whether the Algerian military is capable of managing regional security issues on its own.

Muasher (Marwan), Pierini (Marc) & Djerassi (Alexander), “Between Peril and Promise: A New Framework for Partnership With Tunisia”, The Carnegie Middle East Program, April 14, 2016, Lire / Read.

Abstract : Tunisia’s inclusive democratic development and its resolve against terrorism have won it widespread admiration. But five years after the revolution, internal headwinds and regional whirlwinds continue to bedevil the country, jeopardizing its democratic transition. Tunisians are still waiting for the social and economic grievances that provoked the 2011 revolution to be addressed. To halt the country’s troubling trajectory, address its socioeconomic challenges, and help achieve the revolution’s aims of prosperity, freedom, and dignity, Tunisia and its international partners need a new approach—a Framework for Partnership that couples Tunisian-led reform actions with coordinated and intensified international assistance.

• Martinez (Luis ) and Boserup (Rasmus Alenius ), edited by, Algeria Modern, From Opacity to Complexity, Hurst, CERI Sciences Po Series, April 2016, 176pp. Editor page. Author’s interview by Miriam Perier, SciencesPO; translated by Jason Nagel

Mars 2016

• Yahya (Maha), “Great Expectations in Tunisia”, The Carnegie Middle East Program, March 31, 2016, Lire / Read.

Abstract : Tunisian society is in transition, but without a clear vision to guide it on this journey. The Tunisian political elite forged a new constitution that redefines state-citizen relations, but they have not translated this agreement into practice. Meanwhile, political life is in disarray, state legitimacy is in question, and Tunisians are increasingly worried about the future. Delivering on the great expectations of Tunisians means living up to the fundamental principles enshrined in the constitution and their promise of social justice.

• Ferrié (Jean-Noël), « Éviter le radicalisme: la méthode marocaine », Telos, 3 mars 2016. Lire / Read.

Abstract : Dans le traitement de la religion, les politiques publiques marocaines se sont simultanément orientées vers la promotion du pluralisme des références en même temps que vers la préservation d’un ensemble limité de traditions faisant consensus. La promotion d’une culture diversifiée des droits de l’homme, des festivals de musique du monde, de la langue et de la culture berbère – l’amazighe étant langue nationale au même titre que l’arabe – la constitutionnalisation de l’identité plurielle du Maroc, y compris l’héritage hébraïque et africain, témoignent de ce travail de promotion du pluralisme des références.

Février 2016

• Ounissi (Sayida), “Ennahda from within: Islamists or “Muslim Democrats”?, Islamists On Islamism Today, Brookings’s Rethinking Political Islam project, February 2016, Download

Interview with Sayida Ounissi, Member of Parliament (Ennahda), Tunisia

• Boukhars (Anouar), “The politics of North African Salafism”, Orient II February 2016, 9 p., Download.

Abstract : Amid the volatility of the post-Arab revolts of 2011, Salafi ideology and activism have emerged as the locus of societal contention and political controversy. Scholars and pundits of this ultra-conservative brand of Sunni Islam continue to debate its complexity, contextual diversity and internal dynamics. The most reductive explanations associate Salafi activism with violent extremism or the austere expressions of Saudi Wahhabism. The most insightful ones are those that provide access into the diversity of the Salafi experience, uncovering the social forces and national political trajectories that power its surge in contexts where it was long thought of as a parasitic fringe of contention. Reassessing the reconfigurations of national Salafi ideological politics and their interactions with regional and transnational dynamics is crucial to understanding the ambivalence and complexities of the Salafi phenomenon in the post-Arab Uprising era.

• The Underlying Causes of Stability and Instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, February 2016, “Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Volume One: Regional Trends”, Download, “Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Volume Two: Country-by-Country Trends”, Download, “Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Volume Two: Country-by-Country Trends in North Africa”, Download, “Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Annex: The SIRA Strategic and International Risk Assessment Model”, Download.

Abstract : The Burke Chair at CSIS is introducing a two-volume survey of the underlying causes of stability and instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It draws upon the work of Anthony H. Cordesman, the Burke Chair in Strategy at the CSIS, and Dr. Abdullah Toukan—a Senior Associate at CSIS and President and CEO of Strategic International Risk Assessment (SIRA) in Dubai.

Janvier 2016

• Allal (Amin), « Retour vers le futur. Les origines économiques de la révolution tunisienne », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n° 156, janvier 2016, pp. 17-30.

Abstract: Back to the Future – The Economic Origins of the Tunisian Revolution. Whilst often mentioned and sometimes hammered out, the “economic origins” of the revolution have mostly been ignored. Why is that so? The article attempts to explain this surprising oversight. The emphasis on what was at stake with “the democratic ground rules” has perniciously diverted attention away from the daily economic struggles and their (lack of) regulations as well as the political contradictions they entail. Yet, with the end of the “single window approach” of the Democratic Constitutional Rally (Ben Ali’s all-pervasive party), the question of welfare protection and the various shocks it has received remains acute.

Amrani (Fayçal), « Ennahdha : démocratie et pluralisme », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n° 156, janvier 2016, pp. 95-106.

Abstract : Ennahdha: Democracy and Pluralism – The article examines two central elements of the political doctrine of Ennahdha: pluralism and democracy. By using the official documents of the party and the writings of its leader, it shows that Ennahdha’s understanding of these two concepts is full of ambiguities. In certain respects, they have been deprived of their substance and serve only to justify certain compromising political positions to the party grassroots.

• Boukhars (Anouar), Mauritania’s Precarious Stability And Islamist Undercurrent, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016, 34 p. Lien / Link.

Abstract : Mauritania is a rare bright spot amid regional tumult. Tucked between Arab North Africa and black West Africa, the state has weathered the storms of revolt and militancy gathering around it. This is no small feat for an impoverished country bedeviled by fragile politics, military factionalism, ethno-racial tensions, and budding militancy. After all, this medley of built-in vulnerabilities threw neighboring Mali in 2012 into a perfect storm of political turbulence and separatist insurgency. Mauritania’s success, however, does not mean it is out of the woods yet.

• Boumediene (Malik), « Armée, police et justice dans la Tunisie contemporaine », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n° 156, janvier 2016, pp. 107-118.

Abstract : The Army, the Police and the Judiciary in Contemporary Tunisia – The army, the police and the judiciary represent what we can call the security forces, in charge of guaranteeing public order and security. Yet, in Tunisia, until the end of the previous regime, the security forces were essentially at the service of the political power. Consequently, the fall of President Ben Ali entailed a process of democratisation of these forces. However, certain factors raise questions about this process which might be challenged or significantly slowed down.

• Bras (Jean-Philippe), « Un État « civil » peut-il être religieux ? Débats tunisiens », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n ° 156, janvier 2016, pp. 55-70.

Abstract : Can a “Civil” State be Religious? Tunisian Debates – The place of Islam within the Constitution polarised the constitutional debates in Tunisia between 2011 and 2013. In order to overcome incompatibilities between Ennahdha’s constitutional programme, which proposed to islamize the institutions and the law, and the proposals of the secular parties, which intended to guarantee a clear separation between the State and religion, the constituents used two main methods. On the one hand, “semantic uncertainty” which meant keeping article 1 of the 1959 Constitution with all its linguistic ambiguities; on the other hand, “conceptual creativity” through the emergence of the new notion of a “civil State” that both camps could appropriate while giving it either convergent or divergent meanings.

• Dakhli (Leyla), « Entre fidélité et réconciliation, quelle place pour la politique dans la Tunisie révolutionnaire ? », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n° 156, janvier 2016, p. 7-16

Abstract : Between Loyalty and Reconciliation –  What Role for Politics in a Post-Revolutionary Tunisia? The article explores the situation of Revolutionary Tunisia in 2015 on the basis of the debates regarding the law for economic reconciliation drafted by the current government. The debates highlight the political games and tensions concerning the interpretation of the changes that have occurred since 2010-2011. They allow us to characterize the current period as one of “restoration” within the revolutionary process.

• Fakir (Intissar) & Ghanem-Yazbeck (Dalia), Running Low: Algeria’s Fiscal Challenges and Implications for Stability, Carnegie Middle East Center, February 11, 2016, Link,

Abstract : Strategic spending has long helped the Algerian government placate its citizens and maintain fragile stability. But deteriorating finances could jeopardize that approach.

• Fois (Marisa),” Identity, Politics and Nation: Algerian Nationalism and the ‘Berberist Crisis’ of 1949”, Journal: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 43, Issue 2, April 2016, pp. 206-218.

Abstract : Between the 1940s and the 1950s, a crucial period of change for Algerian nationalism and state formation, Berber activists within the anti-colonial nationalist movement challenged the political line of the nationalist party, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques. This opposition focused on the need to redefine the concept of identity: activists did not reject either Arabic or Islam—the dual linguistic-religious core of national identity for Algerian nationalists—but they identified with a broader idea of an ‘Algerian Algeria’ that could incorporate various components of society. Through the study of archival sources, this paper analyses the origins and consequences of the 1949 controversy within Algerian nationalism known as the ‘Berberist crisis’. Particular attention is paid to the idea of the nation proposed, assessing whether and how Berber activists participated in the political debate and state-building.

• Gobe (Éric), « Système électoral et révolution : la voie tunisienne », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n° 156, janvier 2016, pp.71-82.

Abstract : The Electoral System and the Revolution: The Tunisian Way – The determination of the actors of the Tunisian “revolution” to find the best possible match between the “revolutionary people” and the “voting people” has led them to choose a proportional voting system with highest remainders and without electoral threshold to elect the national constituent Assembly. In practice, by preventing the islamist party Ennahdha from winning the majority of seats in the Assembly, this choice has been seen as a balancing factor between the different political forces, and this has led the members of Parliament to renew the same ballot system for the October 2014 general election.

• Hmed (Choukri), « Au-delà de l’exception tunisienne : les failles et les risques du processus révolutionnaire », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n° 156, janvier 2016, pp.137-150.

Abstract : Beyond Tunisian Exceptionalism: The Flaws and Hazards of the Revolutionary Process – The exceptionalism of the Tunisian revolution has been celebrated in the Western world and evidenced by the relatively peaceful nature of the transition and the many achievements in the political domain. The article shows that, beyond that, four challenges threaten the revolutionary process and hinder the transitional dynamics: terrorism and security challenges, the economic model, social democracy and transitional justice.

• Kréfa (Abir), « Les rapports de genre au coeur de la révolution », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n° 156, janvier 2016, pp.119-136.

Abstract : Gender  Relations at the Core of Revolution? – Breaking with the usual media tropisms and shifting the focus from “women” to gender and sexual relations, the article explains the distribution of positions and jobs on the basis of organisational cultures and structures. It illustrates the generational renewal among feminists and shows that the emphasis on legal rights has eclipsed the social question, whose effects are strongly gendered.

• Liouaeddine (Mariem), Democratization of education and educational inequality in Morocco, Mohammed V university in Rabat, MPRA Paper, 2016, 14 p., In French. Lien.

Abstract : Ainsi, le présent article a pour objectif d’analyser la démocratisation de l’éducation du système éducatif marocain à travers l’étude de l’évolution du taux spécifique de scolarisation. Il se décline en deux sections. La première section met en évidence le concept de « la démocratisation de l’éducation» et le différencie du concept de « la démocratie » avec lequel il est souvent confondu. Elle montre ensuite que le processus de démocratisation n’est pas toujours le même. Ce dernier englobe plusieurs formes à savoir, la démocratisation quantitative, qualitative, uniforme, ségrégative et uniforme. La deuxième section étudie la démocratisation du système éducatif marocain. Celui-ci apparaît comme l’exemple idéal pour notre illustration dû au fait, d’une part, de son passé colonial dont il a hérité un certain nombre de dysfonctionnements. D’autre part, aux efforts de généralisation scolaire consentis pour l’instauration d’une éducation égalitaire à tous.

• Marzouki (Nadia), « La transition tunisienne : du compromis démocratique à la réconciliation forcée », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n° 156, janvier 2016, pp. 83-94.

Abstract : The Tunisian Transition: From Democratic Compromise to Forced Reconciliation – Celebrated as the only success of the Arab Spring, Tunisia has managed to deal with numerous challenges in the post-revolutionary period, thanks to the ability of the main political and social actors to frame compromises. However, the numerous forms of compromises that have characterized the Tunisian transition as well as their implications for democratic pluralism should be examined critically. The article analyses the institutional political transactions that have occurred since 2011 and shows that they have been marked by two different ways of envisaging compromise: reasoned confrontation or containment. It shows how, between 2011 and 2015, the much debated opposition between islamists and secularists has been replaced by a different, more decisive opposition between the partisans of democratic pluralism and the supporters of forced consensus.

• Riahi (Mouldi), « La Constitution : élaboration et contenu », Pouvoirs, La Tunisie, n° 156, janvier 2016, pp. 31-54.

The Constitution: Drafting and Content. The National Constituent Assembly that came out of the 23 October 2011 elections has expressed in the new Constitution the desire of the Tunisian people to break with injustice, iniquity and corruption, and to found a state based on the rule of law and the values of liberty, dignity and justice. A country attached to its identity and its culture while embracing a spirit of openness and tolerance, human values and the universal principles of the rights of man; a democratic and participatory republican regime within the framework of a civil state; a mixed political system with a government accountable to the Assembly of the representatives of the people; the guarantee of an independent judiciary; local powers based on genuine decentralisation; five constitutional bodies to watch over the implementation of these choices, to ensure their persistence and the rights of future generations. Such are the cornerstones of the new Constitution.

Décembre 2015

• Andrew Lebovich, Deciphering Algeria: the stirrings of reform ?, European Council On Foreign Relations, 9th December 2015, 11 p.

Contemporary Algeria presents a puzzle for outside observers. Since the protests of the Arab Spring toppled governments in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, policymakers and analysts have devoted increasing attention to Algeria, but have tended to see it in rather one-dimensional terms. Formerly regarded as a bulwark of regional stability, Algeria is now more often described as a potential source of tension and conflict in the future, especially as the price of oil – the bedrock of Algeria’s economy – remains at its lowest levels in more than a decade. Download

• Janette Uhlmann, Jihadism in the Maghreb : A Threat Assessment, Fondation pour la recherché stratégique, Recherche et documents, n° 06/2015, décembre 2015, 28p.

This note aims to provide a generic risk analysis and take stock of radical extremist activities in North African countries, which present a highly volatile phenomenon and are a threat to national and regional stability. The note presents the following topics :

1. The theoretical and theological underpinnings of radical Islam and jihadism, in particular in the Maghreb;
2. Endemic drivers of violent extremism in the Maghreb;
3. A generic regional threat assessment;
4. A threat assessment by country;
5. Conclusions. Download

• International Crisis Group, The Prize: Fighting for Libya’s Energy Wealth, Middle East and North Africa Report N°165, 3 December 2015, 41 p.

Libya’s economic conditions could turn sharply for the worse, as rival authorities try to control rapidly shrinking national wealth. The struggle affects oil fields, pipelines and export terminals, as well as the boardrooms of national financial institutions. Combined with runaway spending due to corruption and dwindling revenue because of falling exports and energy prices, the financial situation – and with it citizen welfare – faces collapse in the context of a deep political crisis, militia battles and the spread of radical groups, including the Islamic State (IS). If living conditions plunge and militia members’ government salaries are not paid, the two governments competing for legitimacy will both lose support, and mutiny, mob rule and chaos will take over. Rather than wait for creation of a unity government, political and military actors, backed by internationals supporting a political solution, must urgently tackle economic governance in the UN-led talks. Download

Novembre 2015

• Anouar Boukhars, Quietist’ and ‘firebrand’ Salafism in Algeria, 23/11/2015, Policy Brief, FRIDE

Salafi ideology and activism are once again emerging as the locus of societal contention and political controversy in Algeria. ‘Quietist’ Salafists who abstain from politics have traditionally been prevalent in the country but new ‘firebrand’ preachers have grown more assertive. The state has taken an ambivalent approach to the surge of Salafism but is now adopting some measures to marginalize the radical Salafi discourse. However, countering religious extremism ultimately requires addressing the root causes of militancy – persistent political paralysis and lack of opportunity. Download pdf.

• Nathaniel Barr, “If at First You Don’t Succeed, Try Deception: The Islamic State’s Expansion Efforts in Algeria”, Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 13 Issue: 22 November 2015

Nowhere have the organization’s struggles been more pronounced than in Algeria. While Algeria was one of the first countries outside of Syria and Iraq where the Islamic State established a physical presence, two factors have prevented the group from solidifying its gains and making further inroads. First, a superior jihadist organization in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has pushed back against the Islamic State’s encroachment in Algeria. AQIM has waged a propaganda battle against its jihadist rival, and has mounted a military campaign aimed at demonstrating to rank-and-file militants in Algeria that it is more powerful than the Islamic State. Second, Islamic State factions in Algeria have been unable to evade Algeria’s security forces, who have aggressively and proactively cracked down on them. With both AQIM and Algerian security forces pressuring the Islamic State, the group has resorted to a familiar propaganda strategy of deception and exaggeration to preserve its influence in Algeria. Link

• Raphaël Lefèvre, North Africa’s Maliki Crisis, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 20, No. 5, novembre 2015

The Maliki rite has traditionally dominated Islamic practice and jurisprudence in much of Sub-Saharan and West Africa. Historically it was strongest in North Africa. But authoritarian regimes co-opted large parts of the religious elite and have failed to provide state-sanctioned religious education to the youth. This eroded the Maliki rite’s very legitimacy. In turn, Salafi preachers exploited the structural weakness of ‘traditional Islam’ to bolster their own popularity. Now their rise cannot be countered simply through a security approach. Instead, more may need to be done to revive the local appeal of Maliki teachings and to strengthen the importance of places of traditional Islamic learning in North Africa. Download

• Mohammed El-Katiri, From Assistance to Partnership: Morocco and its Foreign Policy in West Africa, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, novembre 2015

Moroccan foreign policy is currently emphasizing its presence and relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular West Africa. The wide range of cooperative projects undertaken in recent years extends to security relations, with Morocco seeking to position itself as a regional security provider. Download

• Georges Fahmi, The Future of Political Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia, November 16, 2015, Carnegie Middle East Center

Peaceful Salafi political parties are losing strength in Egypt and Tunisia while the popularity of Salafi-jihadi movements aiming to build an Islamic state by force is increasing. Link

• Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, Women in the Men’s House: the Road to Equality in the Algerian Military, November 4, 2015,Carnegie Middle East Center

In developed countries, the recruitment of women into the military has been the subject of intense debate for over thirty years. Supporters assert the equal right of women to serve alongside men in the army, even in combat roles, while opponents fear that the very presence of women in what they see as a male institution undermines its esprit de corps and combat efficacy. Some argue that women cannot bear physical harm, although the integration of women into Western armies in increasing numbers suggests otherwise. Download

• Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck, Algeria, the Sleeping Giant of North Africa, Op-Ed, November 4, 2015, Carnegie Middle East Center

Four years after the wave of upheavals that shook the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, the Algerian regime has been able to maintain itself and ensure relative stability in its territory. After a long isolation because of the ‘black decade’ (1991–2000), the country seems to be back in the game and is playing a key role in the stability of North Africa and the Sahel region. Algeria has undeniable assets that could enable it to become North Africa’s regional power, but its deep political and socioeconomic woes are a real constraint on its ambition to become a regional power. Link

• Éric Gobe et Larbi Chouikha, « La Tunisie de la Constitution aux élections : La fin de la transition politique ? », L’Année du Maghreb, 13, novembre 2015, 261-282.

Non sans difficulté, les différents protagonistes du Dialogue national se sont entendus fin 2013 sur l’élection des membres de la nouvelle instance électorale. Ils se sont mis d’accord ensuite sur le choix du nouveau Premier ministre. Aussi en janvier 2014, tout semble prêt pour que le processus institutionnel soit réactivé : la Constitution est votée et des compromis sont trouvés par les divers acteurs politiques pour élaborer une loi électorale consensuelle, ce qui permet aux élections législatives et présidentielles de se dérouler normalement au dernier trimestre 2014. Lien

• Cherif Dris, « Algérie 2014 : De l’élection présidentielle à l’émergence des patrons dans le jeu politique », L’Année du Maghreb, 13, novembre 2015, pp. 149-164.

Si l’élection présidentielle de 2014 n’a pas accouché d’un bouleversement politique majeur, elle a néanmoins donné lieu à des reconfigurations politiques qui ne sont pas de moindre importance. Nous assistons à l’accaparement progressif de l’espace politique par les forces montantes de l’économie algérienne. En effet, l’élection présidentielle a donné aux hommes d’affaires l’occasion d’investir cet espace avec une force et une visibilité nouvelle. Lien

• Saïd Haddad, « La Libye, un État failli ? À propos du chaos libyen et de l’échec d’une transition  », L’Année du Maghreb, 13, novembre 2015, pp 167-191.

En effet, la tenue d’élections législatives, le 25 juin 2014 était supposée mettre un terme au blocage politique libyen qui s’était aggravé avec le renversement par le Congrès général national (CGN) du premier Ministre Ali Zeidan, le 11 mars 2014. Cependant, loin d’apaiser les tensions, la nouvelle configuration politique a exacerbé les antagonismes. Alors que l’État de Libye se retrouve, à la fin de l’été 2014, avec deux gouvernements et deux parlements, la recrudescence des combats et des violences, l’implantation de l’organisation de l’État islamique dans l’Est libyen et les ingérences extérieures font craindre que l’hypothèse d’un État failli ou défaillant, au nord de l’Afrique, se concrétise. Un État failli ou défaillant (failed state). Lien

• Thierry Desrues, « Le gouvernement Benkirane à mi-mandat : De l’art d’agiter les épouvantails », L’Année du Maghreb, 13, novembre 2015, pp. 195-222.

Trois ans après sa nomination à la tête du gouvernement par le roi Mohammed VI, Abdellilah Benkirane, le secrétaire général du Parti de la justice et du développement (PJD), clame haut et fort dès le mois de janvier 2014 qu’il est décidé à poursuivre sur la voie de la rigueur et des réformes1. Peu lui importe si celles-ci vont à l’encontre des intérêts du parti. Or, certains militants islamistes craignent que cette politique ait un impact négatif sur les résultats des échéances électorales prévues au cours des deux années suivantes. À ces craintes qui s’expriment encore de façon isolée, se joignent des reproches à l’encontre des « renoncements » du Chef du gouvernement, supposés satisfaire les desseins royaux. Dans ces conditions les principales menaces pesant sur le leadership de Benkirane ne proviendraient-elles pas des rangs mêmes du PJD ? Lien

Octobre 2015

• Nicolas Dot-Pouillard, Se réveiller conservateur, s’endormir progressiste : le dialogue entre mouvements de gauche et islamistes en Tunisie, Carnets de l’IREMAM, octobre 2015-11-28

Note préparatoire au colloque « Gauches-Islamistes : pourquoi tant de haine ? Historicité et actualité, défis et réponses à la fracture idéologique des oppositions arabes » qui s’est tenu à Aix-en-Provence sous l’égide du programme WAFAW (When Authoritarianism Fails in the Arab World, European Research Council), de l’Institut américain des universités (IAU), et de l’Institut de recherche et d’études sur le monde arabe et musulman (Iremam). Lien

• Philippe Trape & Mickaelle Chauvin, Note Tunisie 2015, Banque Africaine de Développement, octobre 2015 Télécharger

• Hervé Lohoues & Tarik Benhamed, Note Algérie 2015, Banque Africaine de Développement, octobre 2015 Télécharger

• Samia Mansour & Vincent Castel, Note Maroc 2015, Banque Africaine de Développement, octobre 2015 Télécharger

• Georges Fahmi & Hamza Meddeb,  Market for Djihad, Radicalization in Tunisia, October 2015, Carnegie Middle East Center

While Tunisia is the only Arab country undergoing a successful democratic transition as of 2015, it has also been home to a growing Salafi-jihadi movement since the fall of former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. Ben Ali’s monopolization of the religious sphere and neglect of socioeconomic issues opened the door to radicalization, and these factors, combined with the disillusionment of the youth and the mishandling of Salafists after the revolution, have resulted in escalating violence in Tunisia and the export of jihadists to Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Download

• Collectif, L’Algérie, nouvelle force régionale ?, Politique étrangère, n°3, automne 2015, Politique étrangère, n°3, automne 2015

Dans un environnement en feu, l’Algérie semble étrangement calme, mais les orages s’approchent : chute du prix des hydrocarbures dans une économie très dépendante, baisse d’une rente qui assure la paix sociale, blocage du système politique, déstabilisations du Maghreb (Tunisie, Libye…) et du Sahel (Mali…). Alger se retrouve face à des choix difficiles. Comment régler la succession du président Bouteflika, avec une société de plus en plus dépolitisée mais qui conteste l’opacité du régime ? Est-il possible de diversifier enfin une économie toujours structurée par la rente ? Comment se garder des désordres extérieurs ? Principale puissance militaire de la région, l’Algérie a choisi depuis des décennies le non-engagement extérieur, une option qui n’est plus viable. Au plan interne et au plan externe, le régime va devoir démontrer une souplesse qui lui permette de gérer des situations nouvelles et potentiellement très dangereuses.

Introduction : L’Algérie. Blocages internes, instabilités externes par Mansouria Mokhefi (résumé) – L’économie algérienne : chronique d’une crise permanente par Mihoub Mezouaghi (résumé) – La politique étrangère de l’Algérie : le temps de l’aventure ? par Jean-François Daguzan (lire l’article) – Le non-interventionnisme de l’Algérie en question par Geoff D. Porter (résumé) – Alger-Moscou : évolution et limites d’une relation privilégiée par Mansouria Mokhefi (résumé).

• Christine Petré, Tunisian Salafism: the rise and fall of Ansar al-Sharia, 08/10/2015, Policy Brief, FRIDE

Two major terrorist attacks earlier this year, on Sousse beach and the Bardo museum in Tunis, show that Tunisia’s process of democratization has been flanked by a growth in the influence of jihadist groups. Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST) was the biggest and most influential Jihadi-Salafi group following the 2011 revolution, but has been driven underground by a government crackdown since 2013. However, AST’s demise may now encourage more Tunisian youths to align with Islamic State. Furthermore, the rise and fall of AST shows the need to balance short term counter-terrorism measures with longer-term youth-focused policies. Download pdf

• Amel Boubekeur, Islamists, secularists and old regime elites in Tunisia: bargained competition, Mediterranean Politics, octobre 2015

This article analyses the confrontations and compromises for domination of the political arena and its rules that are going on in Tunisia since the 2011 revolution between the Islamists of Ennahda party and the networks of so-called secularists and old regime elites – in particular, Nidaa Tounes. On the contrary to accounts that claim that the taming of ideological conflicts between religious and secular parties has given birth to a new democratic society, I argue that the new Tunisian order is the result of a particular type of post-authoritarian political culture that I call bargained competition. It consists in Islamists and old regime elites bargaining on their mutual reintegration and their monopolization of the post-revolutionary political scene while fiercely competing over political resources through various (often informal) power-sharing arrangements. Link

• Wolfram Lachera, Libya’s local elites and the politics of alliance building, Mediterranean Politics, octobre 2015

In post-revolutionary Libya, the collapse of central authority and the fragmentation of territorial control have produced a fundamental change in the political elite. Local elites emerged as the leading actors and held the key to whether central authority would be re-established. These local elites faced strategic choices in building alliances among themselves: they could seek to enter and back the central government; build an anti-government coalition to exert veto power; or focus on consolidating control over their local turf. What determines local elite strategies? This article charts the rise of local elites in Libya and examines their attempts at alliance building until autumn 2014. Based on five weeks of field research conducted in 2014, the article analyses elite strategies in three Libyan cities: Misrata, Bani Walid and Tobruk. Link

• Maati Monjib, Morocco’s illiberal regime and fragmented political society, October 2015, Arab Citizenship Review n.10, EUSPRING

In Morocco, the post-Arab Spring period can be divided into different stages, based on the regime’s response to the demands of the protesters. During the first stage, starting with the protests in February 2011 and lasting until the summer of 2013, the ruling elite in Morocco implicitly, yet officially, accepted the public’s critique on its governance practices, and promised to change public policies related to civil, political and social rights. But the government reshuffle and political crisis in the latter half of 2013 prevented the implementation of the promised reforms, and protesters became impatient with the slow pace of change. The ensuing unrest and chaos heralded the beginning of a gradual decline of newly-gained freedoms and citizenship rights and, because of the increasing threat of violence in the region, a renewed focus on internal stability and security. Download

• Raouf Boucekkine et Nour Meddahi, Pour faire face au contre-choc pétrolier : Quelle politique budgétaire ? Comment financer l’économie ?, Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d’Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), 8 octobre 2015.

Cette contribution est une proposition de plan de sortie de crise pour l’économie algérienne afin qu’elle évite des conséquences aussi fâcheuses que celles engendrées par le premier contre-choc pétrolier, celui de 1986. Télécharger

• International Crisis Group, L’Algérie et ses voisins, Rapport Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord N°164, octobre 2015, 34 p.

L’Algérie est en passe de devenir un intermédiaire indispensable de la stabilité en Afrique du Nord et au Sahel. Ce que d’aucuns appellent « le retour » de l’Algérie à la politique régionale, après une longue absence depuis sa guerre civile ou « décennie noire » dans les années 1990, a été positif à bien des égards : son approche de la promotion de l’inclusion et du compromis pour stabiliser ses voisins, mue par un intérêt personnel éclairé, offre une occasion à un système international qui a lutté pour faire face aux défis engendrés par les soulèvements arabes. Mais les ambitions algériennes ont des limites auto-im­posées. Une scène politique nationale moribonde, un régime déchiré par les factions et l’incertitude quant au futur successeur d’Abdelaziz Bouteflika, un président malade, ont embrumé l’horizon politique. Les relations avec d’autres puissances ayant du poids dans la région, notamment le Maroc et la France, disposent encore d’une marge d’amélioration. Télécharger Download

Août 2015

• Ahmed Benchemsi, Islam and the Spread of Individual Freedoms : The Case of Morocco, August 20, 2015, Nr 778, Policy analysis, Cato Institute

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with a freely elected government. However, the North African country’s constitution makes clear that, whatever the outcome of free elections, the real and undisputed center of power is the royal palace. Not only is Islam the official religion of the State, but freedom of conscience is unknown, as virtually all Moroccan citizens are deemed Muslims by birth. All legislation pertaining to family matters and social interactions derive, directly or indirectly, from Islamic laws. Yet despite this adverse environment, a strong secular and pro-individual freedom movement exists and has been able to score important tactical victories in recent years. Less government control generated a wider space for social activism and freedom of expression. Though it has become a vast movement including hundreds of non governmental organizations and influential lobbying groups, the Moroccan movement for individual freedoms still suffers from dispersion and relative disorganization. Download

• Monica Marks, Tunisia’s Ennahda: Rethinking Islamism in the context of ISIS and the Egyptian coup, Working paper, Rethinking Political Islam series, Brooking Institution, août 2015

A series of regional and local challenges—including the rise of Salafi-jihadism, the 2013 coup in Egypt, and local suspicions over its aims—have prompted Tunisia’s Ennahda party to narrow its range of political maneuver and rethink the parameters of its own Islamism. Ennahda has assumed a defensive posture, casting itself as a long-term, gradualist project predicated on compromise, a malleable message of cultural conservatism, and the survival of Tunisia’s democratic political system. Download

• Larbi Chouikha & Éric Gobé, Histoire de la Tunisie depuis l’indépendance, La Découverte, Paris, 128 p.

Au début de 2011, en chassant du pouvoir un dictateur vieillissant, la Tunisie a été propulsée sur la scène médiatique internationale. Initiateur des « printemps arabes », ce petit pays donnait pourtant l’image d’un régime stable, certes dirigé par un despote, mais ouvert sur l’Occident. Cependant, la question de la succession du président Ben Ali amenait certains auteurs à s’interroger sur la durabilité d’un pouvoir largement fondé sur la coercition. Ce livre apporte des clés pour comprendre la manière dont le régime autoritaire tunisien s’est construit, puis pérennisé, et a été remis en cause. Si le système politique instauré par le président Bourguiba (1956-1987) était sous-tendu par un projet de société modernisateur, celui du président Ben Ali (1987-2011) visait à transformer le pouvoir en un instrument d’accumulation de richesses économiques au profit d’un clan familial. La rupture introduite par la « révolution » de 2011 a ouvert la voie à un nouveau cycle politique.

• Avi Spiegel, Succeeding by surviving: Examining the durability of political Islam in Morocco, Working paper, Rethinking Political Islam series, Brooking Institution, août 2015

Moroccan Islamists have proven resilient in the wake of the Arab Spring and have offered a different model of Islamist participation that partly reflects the country’s unique monarchical context. The Brotherhood-inspired Justice and Development Party (PJD) has secured a foothold in government through an accommodationist posture towards Morocco’s monarchy, while the anti-monarchical popular movement Al Adl Wal Ihsan has sustained its appeal and access through non-violent activism. Download

• OCDE, OECD, Le gouvernement ouvert au Maroc, Open Government in Morocco, Examens de l’OCDE sur la gouvernance publique, août 2015,

La Revue du Gouvernement Ouvert au Maroc est la première de son genre à analyser les politiques et les pratiques de gouvernement ouvert ainsi que l’application de leur cadre institutionnel et juridique selon les instruments de l’OCDE. En rassemblant une multitude d’instruments de l’OCDE et d’expertises dans différents domaines de gouvernance publique, la revue fournit aux décideurs politiques marocains, aux fonctionnaires du secteur public et aux activistes de la société civile des indications pratiques concernant la façon d’améliorer et de mettre en œuvre avec succès leur programme national de gouvernement ouvert. De plus, la revue contient une liste de recommandations sur laquelle il est possible de s’appuyer pour construire le Plan d’Action du Maroc pour le Partenariat pour un gouvernement ouvert. Link / Lien

• Fadma Ait Mous, Olivier Deau, Maâti Monjib, The debates on citizenship in Morocco: Social movements and constitutional reform, Citizenship report n2., August 2015, EUSPRING

The current debates on citizenship in Morocco are taking place in a political context marked by the events of the Arab Spring. How are political, social, legal, and identity-related dimensions of citizenship formulated in the context of a monarchy that has a long continuity in Moroccan history? Download

Juillet 2015

• International Crisis Group, Réforme et stratégie sécuritaire en Tunisie, Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afrique du Nord, N°161, 23 Juillet 2015 / Reform and Security Strategy in Tunisia, Middle East and North Africa Report N°161, 23 Jul 2015,

Sans une réforme des forces de sécurité intérieures qui permettrait d’appliquer une stratégie de sécurité globale, le pays maintiendra une gestion des crises au coup par coup, à mesure que son environnement régional se dégrade et que ses tensions politiques et sociales augmentent, au risque de sombrer dans le chaos ou de renouer avec la dictature. Prévenir ce scénario demande un effort conjoint de la classe politique et du secteur de la sécurité intérieure. Ceci semble fondamental pour éloigner la tentation de restaurer la « peur du policier » ou de conférer toujours plus de tâches de sécurité intérieure à l’armée nationale dans le but de compenser la faiblesse et la mauvaise gestion des forces de sécurité intérieures. Cet ensemble de mesures représente une étape préliminaire essentielle pour repenser la réponse à la montée des violences sociales et politiques. Celles-ci constituent un enjeu national qui va au-delà de la mission des forces de l’ordre : nécessité à terme de concrétiser des projets de développement dans les régions frontalières, de rénover l’habitat dégradé dans les zones périurbaines, d’améliorer les conditions carcérales, et de promouvoir des alternatives à l’idéologie jihadiste, entre autres. Les FSI ne doivent pas se retrouver seules à combler le manque de vision stratégique de la classe politique. Download (english) Télécharger (français)

• Hamadi Redissi and Rihab Boukhayatia, The National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia and Civil Society Dynamics, Citizenship report n1, July 2015, EUSPRING

The Tunisian constitution of 27 January 2014 was deemed essentially compatible with international human rights principles and standards. These were adopted at the outcome of a dual process, which was underway both inside the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and outside it, between the NCA and civil society stakeholders. Three successive drafts fell considerably short of expectations (6 August 2012, 14 December 2012 and 22 April 2013). The fourth draft (1 June 2013) was still fraught with 20 or so fundamental divergences. These were resolved, thanks to the National Dialogue in cooperation with the ad hoc “consensus commission” (lajnet tawafuqat) within the NCA, which is chaired by Mustapha Ben Jaafar (President of the NCA). The final text was overwhelmingly adopted on 26 January 2014 by 200 votes, with 12 against and four abstentions. It was promulgated on 10 February. Download

• Saïd Belguidoum & Olivier Pliez (dir.), Made in China. Commerce transnational et espaces urbains autour de la Méditerranée, Etudes sur le monde arabe et méditerranéen, Les Cahiers d’EMAM, 26, juillet 2015.

Ce dossier (11 articles en texte intégral) apporte un nouvel éclairage sur les routes, les places et les acteurs du commerce transnational. Les contributions portent principalement sur l’Algérie, mais elles traitent aussi du Maroc et de la Tunisie. Le processus étudié est celui de la montée en puissance du commerce transnational qui se traduit par la multiplication des sources d’approvisionnement des marchandises, une imbrication croissante de liens sociaux et spatiaux mais parfois aussi des formes de côtoiements (Africains sub-sahariens et Chinois au Maghreb, Arabes en Chine…) et ceci à différentes échelles, depuis les places marchandes insérées dans ces formes de négoce (à Oran, Constantine ou Yiwu) jusqu’aux régions (Moyen Atlas marocain, Jeffara tunisienne ou Kurdistan irakien). Lien.

• Raouf Boucekkine, Rafik Bouklia-Hassane et Nour Meddahi, L’Algérie en état d’urgence économique, un an après le contre-choc pétrolier : Un agenda de réformes inexorable, Aix Marseille School of Economics, 6 juillet 2015

Il y a un an, le prix du baril de pétrole a entamé une longue et forte baisse qui a engendré des conséquences très négatives pour les économies pétrolières comme celle de L’Algérie. Ainsi, le prix du baril du pétrole Brent qui valait 110 $ fin juin 2014 ne valait que 63 $ fin juin 2015, soit une baisse de plus de 40 %, avec un minimum à 48 $ au mois de janvier et une moyenne de 60 $ pour les six premiers mois de 2015. Parce que l’économie algérienne est fortement dépendant des recettes des hydrocarbures, cette baisse a entraîné des conséquences dramatiques à bien des égards. Télécharger

Juin 2015

• Benjamin Augé, L’Algérie, un Etat pétrolier en danger, juin 2015, IFRI

Alors que le secteur pétrolier mondial traverse une crise majeure depuis l’effondrement des prix du brut en juin 2014, il est utile d’analyser plus en détails les raisons pour lesquelles les sociétés privées se désintéressent de l’Algérie et d’étudier les conséquences pour Sonatrach, qui, après huit mois de direction par intérim, a accueilli de nouveaux dirigeants à la mi-mai 2015, sans que ces derniers n’aient pris de décisions fondamentales à ce jour. La focalisation actuelle sur l’exploration du gaz de schiste dans le sud du pays pose également des problèmes internes Télécharger

Mai 2015

• Michele Dunne,  Is Unemployment to Blame for Radicalization?, OP­ED, May 22, 2015, World Economic Forum, Carnegie Middle East Center

Youth unemployment in the Middle East is among the highest in the world but it remains an inadequate explanation for radicalization. Link

Mars 2015

• Anouar Boukhars, Political tensions mount in Southern Algeria, 25/03/2015, Commentary, FRIDE

The Algerian government is under increasing pressure, stemming from political and social turmoil in the south of the country. This comes amidst mounting terrorist threats and economic concerns due to low oil prices. The south holds the majority of the country’s oil and gas reserves and is key for Algeria’s security. The area’s wealth and size (it accounts for more than 80 per cent of the national territory) have contributed enormously to Algeria’s economic standing and geostrategic clout. According to International Monetary Fund 2011 data, hydrocarbons account for over 69 per cent of public revenues and 36 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. Download.

• Mohammed Masbah,  His Majesty’s Islamists: The Moroccan Experience, March 23, 2015, Carnegie Middle East Center

Through compromise and cooperation, Morocco’s king and the ruling Islamist Party of Justice and Development have figured out how to get along. Link

• OCDE / OECD, Investir dans la jeunesse en Tunisie, Renforcer l’employabilité des jeunes pendant la transition vers une économie verte / Investing in Youth: Tunisia Strengthening the Employability of Youth during the Transition to a Green Economy, mars 2015,

Ce rapport présente un diagnostic détaillé du marché du travail des jeunes en Tunisie, en prêtant une attention particulière à la formation professionnelle et à l’entrepreneuriat et en se plaçant dans le contexte de la transition de la Tunisie vers une économie verte. Il opte pour une perspective comparative internationale dans son analyse des différents moyens d’améliorer le passage de l’école au travail. Il offre aussi à d’autres pays la possibilité de tirer des enseignements des mesures novatrices prises par la Tunisie pour renforcer les compétences des jeunes et leurs résultats en matière d’emploi. Lien (français), Link (english)